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LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CANADIAN 
INDIAN COMMUNITIES 
REFORMING THE PRESENT AND 
INCORPORATING THE PAST 
]. ANTHONY LONG and MENNO BOLDT 
With improving prospects of achieving a 
greater measure of political autonomy for their 
governments, native Indian leaders in Canada 
are heginning to klOk seriously at reforming 
internal tribal/band political structures. Their 
objectives arc to establish band governments 
that meet the present social and economic 
needs of Indian peoples as well as reflect 
traditional political values. A "hand" is a legal 
entity specified in the Indian Act, a federal 
statute that has governed Indians in Canada 
since shortly after Confederation. In most 
instances the band corresponds to traditional 
tribal social and political organization, and 
these concepts are now often used inter-
changeahly. ' 
In attempting to reform band govern-
Professors at the Unit'ersit\, of Lethhridge, J. 
Anthon)' Long (political science) and Menno Boldt 
(sociolog\) are co-editors tcith Lno) Little Bear of 
Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian 
Indians and the Canadian State (I9R4) and 
The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and 
Aboriginal Rights (I9R5). 
[CI'I..2 7 (Spring IcJS7): 1[1, 1 IS) 
ments, Indian leaders face formidahle ohsta-
cles. First, there is a virtual absence of research 
on the performance of current hand govern-
ment systems in the political and administra-
tive spheres. In particular, Indian leaders lack 
information on the efficiency and accountahil-
ity of their leadership selection processes and 
on the operation of their band councils.: 
Second, band councils arc derived from Euro-
Canadian political concepts and structures 
that have been imposed by the Indian Act. 
Traditional indigenous institutions and prac-
tices have been systematically suppressed hy a 
succession of Department of Indian Affairs 
administrations. Finally, reforms to current 
band councils and their electoral systems arc 
required to conform to the principles of the 
recently enacted Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which are based upon individu-
alistic western liheral democratic values and, as 
such, conflict with much of traditional indige-
nous political ideology.: 
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, 
using data from band council elections and 
information from interviews with Indian lead-
ers, we examine how the processes of lead-
ership selection under the Indian Act elective 
system occur on the reserves of the Bloods and 
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Peigans, two subtribes of the historical Black-
foot Nation.' (In Canada, lands allocated by 
treaty to Indians that fall under the Indian Act 
are called "reserves" in contrast to the Ameri-
can term "reservation.") In our analysis we 
compare band council elections on the two 
reserves with municipal council elections in 
three adjacent non-Indian towns, Pincher 
Creek, Fort Macleod, and Cardston, Alberta. 
The Indian Act elective system is based on the 
same ideological principles as the municipal 
electoral systems. Thus, the municipal council 
elections can serve as useful reference points in 
our attempt to understand how the Indian Act 
elective system functions within the Blood and 
Peigan political systems. Second, employing 
the results of this analysis we seek to determine 
what impact the Indian Act elective system, 
with its associated Euro-Canadian political 
values, has had on the traditional leadership 
selection practices among the Bloods and 
Peigans. 
The Blood and Peigan bands are among 
the largest and most modern Indian commu-
nities in Canada; therefore, we do not claim 
that the specific characteristics exhibited in the 
operation of their leadership selection systems 
are typical of Indian bands across Canada. 
However, because nearly all Indian bands in 
Canada have elective systems for choosing 
band council members our analysis can serve 
as a reference point for future studies in this 
area. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The Blood and Peigan reserves are located 
in southern Alberta within Treaty Area ]\0. 7. 
They were established in 1883 and 1877, 
respectively. The Blood reserve has a popula-
tion of over 6,000 and, geographically, is the 
largest reserve in Canada, comprising nearly 
546 square miles. The Peigan reserve covers an 
area of approximately 210 square miles and has 
a population of slightly over 2,000. 
Both the Blood and Peigan band govern-
ments receive more than 80 percent of their 
annual revenue from the federal government 
in the form of funds allocated for specific 
purposes. In addition, the band governments 
receive a limited amount of income from a 
capital trust fund, administered by the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment, that contains royalties and other 
revenues from natural gas and oil production 
on reserve lands. In an effort to generate more 
revenue from internal sources and to create 
employment opportunities, both bands have 
attempted to develop an agricultural and 
small-business enterprise based economic in-
frastructure. The agricultural sector consists of 
individual mixed farming and ranch holdings, 
communally owned farms and cattle opera-
tions, and extensive land leases to neighboring 
non-Indian farmers. The small business enter-
prises currently include a prefabricated home 
manufacturing company, clothing manufac-
turing firms, and arts and crafts outlets. 
Despite moves by both bands toward 
economic modernization, per capita income 
and rates of employment remain far below 
those of comparable non-Indian populations. 
Unemployment on the two reserves currentlv 
averages 75 percent, compared to an average 
rate of 9.5 percent for the adjacent municipali-
ties and for Canadians generally. Moreover, 
legal strictures imposed by the Indian Act, and 
lack of start-up capital, have hindered devel-
opment of business enterprises on the reserves. 
Both bands are experiencing rapid population 
growth and, with static land bases, most 
younger Indians are forced to live on welfare, 
while a few move off the reserves to find 
employment. 
In the past two decades, both bands have 
developed fairly extensive bureaucratic struc-
tures, paralleling those of non-Indian munici-
palities. The emergence of bureaucratic 
infrastructures is due, partly, to a policy of the 
federal government, beginning in the 19605, 
that encouraged transfer of program delivery 
control from the Department of Indian Affairs 
to "qualified" indi\'idual bands, The de\el-
opment and elaboration of bureaucratic struc-
tures also reflects a deliberate attempt on the 
part of the two Indian bands to control and 
manage their own internal affairs in such 
critical areas as economic planning, land use, 
education, child welfare, and social devel-
opment. 
Of the three adjacent non-Indian towns 
that are used in our study, Pincher Creek is 
located approximately 15 kilometers west of 
the Peigan reserve; Fort Macleod is located 
midway between the Blood and Peigan re-
serves; and Cardston borders the southeastern 
end of the Blood reserve. These towns have 
populations between 3,000 and 3,500. All 
three towns have agrarian based economies 
and have socially homogeneous populations, 
comprised mainly of retired farmers, small 
business owners and their employees, and local 
and provincial government workers. Town 
revenues are derived from general per capita 
and conditional grants from the province, 
local property taxes, and licensing and other 
fees. 
COUNCIL ELECTIVE SYSTEMS 
The imposition of the Indian Act elective 
system on Indian bands represented a major 
initiative by the Canadian government to 
"civilize," that is, to assimilate, the Indian 
tribes. Because it incorporated the western 
liberal democratic concepts of individual polit-
ical rights, representation, and election by 
plurality, the Indian Act elective system was 
viewed by the Canadian government as superi-
or to the communal and consensus-based 
indigenous political systems. 5 In the words of 
Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs Wil-
liam Spragge in 1871, the elective system 
would substitute "a responsible, for an irre-
sponsible system."o 
Within the broad objective of assimilation, 
the elective system was intended to accomplish 
two goals: first, to indoctrinate Indians into a 
Euro-Canadian political culture, thus prepar-
ing them, ultimately, to live within local 
government systems; and, second, to eliminate 
traditional Indian political values, institutions, 
and governing processes.; Historically, how-
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ever, the elective system has also been used as 
an instrument of control in the Canadian 
government's general policy of internal coloni-
alism.' Traditional tribal structures often pro-
vided centers of resistance to government 
Indian policies. For the purpose of controlling 
band activities by Indian Affairs, elected band 
councils were more cooperative and organiza-
tionally more compatible than the traditional 
tribal decision-making structures. 
Although the Blood and Peigan bands did 
not come under the electoral provisions of the 
Indian Act formally and fully until 1962, 
under the authority of federal government 
agents they had begun to operate an embryon-
ic form of this system as early as the 1930s. A 
rudimentary, informal elective system was 
imposed on both reserves during the inter-
World War period when the Department of 
Indian Affairs decided to extend the elective 
system to prairie reserves. 9 Under the informal 
system, councilmen were elected by a show of 
hands and chiefs were appointed by a federal 
government agent. By the early 1960s, howev-
er, under pressure from the Canadian govern-
ment, the Blood and Peigan bands, along with 
other prairie Indian bands, formally and fully 
adopted the provisions of the Indian Act band 
council elective system. 
Section 74 of the Indian Act, which 
governs the composition and methods of 
selection of band councils, prescribes that each 
band can elect one chief and one councillor for 
everyone hundred band members, to a 
maximum of twelve councillors. Regardless of 
the size of the band, at least two councillors 
must be chosen. Section 74(3) provides as 
follows: 
a) that the chief of a band shall be elected 
by 
i) a majority of the votes of the 
electors of the band, or 
ii) a majority of the votes of the 
elected councillors of the band 
from among themselves, but the 
chief so elected shall remain a 
councillor; and 
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b) that the councillors of a band shall he 
elected by 
i) a majoritv of the votes of the 
electors of the band, or 
ii) a majority of the votes of the 
electors of the band in the 
electoral section in which the 
candidate resides and that he 
proposes to represent on the 
council of the hand. 
Sections 75 through 80 of the Act allow the 
governor in council and the minister to 
regulate qualifications of electors, nomination 
meetings, voting procedures, and election 
appeals. Within these same sections, provi-
sions exist for declaring the office of chief or 
councillor vacant and for prescribing circum-
stances under which elections can be declared 
invalid. 
In the mid-1970s both the Blood and 
Peigan bands sought and were given permis-
sion by the Department of Indian Affairs to 
conduct their band council elections under the 
"custom" provision (2: la) of the Indian Act. 
The custom provision allows a band to opt out 
of Section 74 and choose its council "accord-
ing to the custom of the Band." This does not 
mean, however, that the Blood and Peigan 
bands could revert to their traditional meth-
ods of choosing leaders. Rather, the custom 
option allows a band to operate its electoral 
system differently from the specific require-
ments of the Indian Act. k Under this provi-
sion, the bands were given authority to 
exercise control with respect to nominating 
and voting procedures, and candidate qualifi-
cations. However, the only changes of any 
significance actually made by the Blood and 
Peigan bands under the custom provision were 
the extension of the franchise to band mem-
bers living off the reserves, and the imposition 
of a nomination fee to be assessed all candi-
dates standing for election to band council. 
They retained all other provisions of the 
Indian Act. 
The size and composition of town councils 
in the adjacent towns of Pincher Creek, Fort 
Macleod, and Cardston, as well as the rules 
regulating their election, are specified by the 
Alberta Municipal Government Act and the 
Alberta Local Authorities Election Act. The 
Alberta Municipal Gm'Crnment Act provides 
for an elected council of six members, a 
separately elected mayor, and a chief adminis-
trative officer appointed by the council. The 
authority of the chief administrative officer 
extends to specific duties assigned by the 
council. The Local Authorities Election Act 
contains detailed regulations governing town 
council and mayoral elections, including voter 
and candidate eligibility requirements, limits 
on candidate nomination fees, and election 
procedures. Although no legal impediments 
exist for the promotion of candidates by 
political parties in local elections, municipal 
politics in Alberta have remained non-parti-
san. 
LEADERSHIP SELECTIli:\ SYSTE~lS 
To understand how the Indian Act elective 
s\'stem currently operates as a leadership 
sciection system on the Blood and Peigan 
resenTS we use electoral data from 1965 
through 1987 as a starting point for analysis. 
Specificallv, we look at candidate participation 
rates, voter participation rates, and re-election 
of incumbents. \Ve relate this data to compara-
ble ciection data from the three adjacent non-
Indian rural communities. While aggregate 
election data have limitations for explaining 
how leadership selection systems function, 
nonetheless they can direct us toward fruitful 
areas for examination. 
For purposes of analysis \\'e have broken 
down the band and town council election data 
into the following categories: voter turnout, 
number of candidates for chief or mayor, 
number of candidates for council, number of 
successful incumbents, and percentage of \·otes 
GIst to elect the chief or mavor and members of 
the counciL" Such a breakdown gives us 
electoral data in a form comparable to that 
conventionally used to disaggregate and eval-
uClte elections, Clnd it allO\\'s us to make 
compClrisons between band council elections 
aIl e! the c'lenil)!l s in adjacent non-Indian 
muni ci palities. (See table 1.) In order to 
determine whether or not imposing a candi-
dme nOln1l1atilln fee had any effect on voting 
,mel C<lnel id al: \ pa rrerm , In: hm'e o rganized the 
han d cou n,il denion data into pre- and post-
nomi nation-fcc peri ods. 
'\'I{mhn of Cunellelmes and Political Recrult-
mem. The striking ,bpect of band council 
electiuns is the number of candidates standing 
for election at both the council and chief 
lew k The average numher of candidates 
standing for each counci l seat in adjacent 
t(1\ln, rard\' exceeds tll'O, and the norm is 
fe\I'er t han (\1'0 candidates standing for mayor. 
Bv clmtrast, the average number of candidates 
fur ench council posi tion on the Blood reserve 
Ilib 5.75 during the pre-nomination-fee period 
and 7.00 in the post-nomination-fee period. 
A mo ng the Peigaf1S the number of band 
cou ncil candidates al't.' rnged 4. 06 and 2.58 
rl'spect ivelv. during the same periods. The 
average number of candidates for the 
'. hiefrainship on the Blood reserve \\'as 6.75 for 
the Im :-nomination-fee-period and 9.00 for the 
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post-nomination-fee period. For the Peigans 
the number of chieftainship candidates aver-
3ged 5.70 3nd 4.33 respectively, during the 
5nme periods. 
There is nothing unique about the Indian 
An elective system, \\'hen compared to non-
Indian municipal electoral systems, that 
should produce this result. There are no legal 
impediments to large numbers of candidates 
seeking council seats in non-Indian commu-
nities. Wh y then do band council elections 
attract so many more candidates than non-
Indian local elections? We propose that the 
difference derives to a great extent from the 
particular candidate recruitment conventions 
and processes that exist on both reserves, 
I\·hich are quite different from those in the 
neighboring non-Indian towns. 
The literature on political recruitment 
\\'ithin non-partisan municipal election sys-
tems at the smaller community level points to 
the existence of screening/ sponsoring mech-
anisms that serve to limit the number of 
candidates in the electoral contest. The screen-
ing mechanisms may take the form of civic 
T "IlLE 1 
ELEC TI, ':\ D ,\TA 
A\'e r<lgl' :\ (l <.) 1 C ,m.ld a t <-' :-. 
Sr ;ll1J lng tnr Ch ic! In B;m J 
[ l e l ti () n~. 1',,)[ \ L l\' (' r 111 
\luI11 c:p31 E lcc:t )\ 
:-\\c rn~(' Pc rCl'nt .1gc ()t 
Cnuncil j!ldJ mh c Ilt:- \\' lw 
Wl' !"L' RC-l'lcdcJ 
:4 
" 
:,~ 
., 
; ~ . -+ q"" 
-i ~ .('l~ " " 
4.,'(' 
I 
..; ,_ 'l'l" 
[. 
4 ,. 
, ~ 1: '\. 
:. S:-
-+ ~i , :; 1 '\' 
44 ,4 ~' \\, 
A Jj;Kcnt Town C o unc il Electio ns 
1 Wi 4- 1 986 (T h rct' - )'C;1f Term ) 
2.2 :; 2.40 
q ) . l~7 ()(1 62 .170,0 ;9. 48% 
L-n 2.16 1. 57 
.~ 1.63°" 60. 1 7O,() 79 .4 3% 
"p.).'r,u" -i l. OO°tJ 62.4 1 % 
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election associations or community, business, 
and service organizations, which perform an 
informal recruitment function. The role of 
these groups usually is to help define the 
structure of political opportunity in the sense 
of identifying who can compete for electoral 
office with a reasonable chance of success. In 
other words, relatively extensive involvement 
in community, business, or service organiza-
tions is generally a prerequisite for a successful 
candidacy for town council. I: It is true that 
some candidates are self-recruited outside of 
the network of community associations, but 
these tend to be exceptions to the rule. A 
significant characteristic of non-partisan mu-
nicipal elections, then, is that a pre-election 
screening process takes place. 
In Blood and Peigan politics, no compara-
ble screening processes and norms have devel-
oped to limit the number of candidates 
entering the electoral arena. Instead, candidate 
selection is influenced by a set of factors 
unique to band politics. Our interviews with 
leaders in both Indian bands have identified 
several factors that influence such a large 
number of candidates to enter the electoral 
arena. 1 ; We will briefly discuss these under the 
categories: (1) social and cultural factors; (2) 
economic and institutional factors; and (3) 
electoral behavior. 
Social and Cultural Factors. The authors of 
the Hawthorn Report, in their study of the 
Blood reserve during the 1960s, found that the 
principle of "sectional representation," which 
corresponded to kinship group representation, 
played a significant role in candidate recruit-
ment and voting support on the Blood reserve. 
Each kinship group, or "historical band," 
would put forward several candidates for 
council seats, and the members of that kinship 
group would vote for their relatives. The 
pattern of candidates emerging from this 
process would result in a more or less equal 
number of representatives on the band council 
from the various kinship groups. I' The kinship 
variable, therefore, was important for Haw-
thorn and associates in explaining the large 
number of candidates that ran under the 
Indian Act electoral system. 
Although family group members are no 
longer geographically grouped on the Blood 
resenT because of land allocation and econom-
ic development policies, our interviews suggest 
that kinship continues to be an explanatory 
factor for the large number of candidates in 
the Blood and Peigan elections. Family group-
ings on both reserves, especially wealthier kin 
groups, continue to run slates of candidates 
during each election to maintain their advan-
taged status within the tribe. Sponsorship of 
candidates usually takes place in informal 
family group caucuses, where decisions are 
made as to who should run for council and 
who should not. The existence of the kinship 
group as a recruitment system is reflected in 
the candidate lists, where identifiable clusters 
of family surnames appear. It is particularly 
evident in the chieftainship contests, where 
major family groups are represented by at least 
one candidate and sometimes two. There arc 
no direct parallels to kinship group recruit-
ment structures in non-Indian municipal poli-
tics. Non-partisan electoral associations are 
generally open, not exclusive, and the numher 
of these associations in existence in any given 
small town election is far fewer than the 
number of family groups running members for 
council on Indian reserves. 
Kinship sponsored candidate recruitment 
as it occurs in today's band elections should 
not, however, be equated with traditional 
family based leadership selection processes. In 
traditional hands, an individual who distin-
guished himself as a coordinator and facilitator 
of collective action rose through the family 
structure and, eventually, succeeded to lead-
ership position within the broader trihe.·" He 
did not compete with other family group 
nominees in a trihal election. Moreover, a 
variation of the traditional kinship 
sponsorship system has emerged on both 
reserves-self-selected candidates who enter 
the election contest in the hopes of receiving 
votes from their relatives. In other words, 
although official "family" sponsorship is not 
involved, the individual expects to receive 
family \ocing support. 
Economic and Institutional Factors. In their 
survey of Indian communities, the authors of 
the Hawthorn Report found a strong correla-
tion between the number of candidates for 
council positions and the size of band funds.;; 
A comparison of the average numbers of 
candidates in Blood band elections as com-
pared to Peigan band elections appears to 
confirm Hawthorn's finding. The Blood 
band's annual budget is several times greater 
than that of the Peigan band, and the average 
number of Blood council candidates is approx-
imately twice as high as on the Peigan reserve. 
Although the implications of this correlation 
were given only limited consideration in the 
Hawthorn Report, we can suggest two specu-
lative interpretations: one, it may be that 
candidates run for council to advance the 
common good, that is, the size of band funds 
makes it possible for the council to accomplish 
something positive for the reserve community; 
and two, candidates run for council to take 
advantage of band resources for the benefit of 
themselves, their relatives, and friends. In 
regard to the first suggested interpretation it 
,hould be noted that, although the Blood 
band controls greater funds than the Peigan 
band, both bands are poor by prevailing 
Canadian standards. Neither band has suffi-
cient income to provide a level of services to its 
members comparable to that existing off the 
resen·es. Moreover, because of the high level 
of fiscal and political control that the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs exercises over band 
councils and tribal administration, council 
members have little latitude in determining 
how band funds are to be spent. The combina-
tion of chronic under funding and Indian 
Affairs control over how band monies are 
spent, makes serving on band council an 
experience in frustration rather than of satis-
faction gained from advancing the common 
good. Band councillors on both reserves have 
confirmed this view to us. 
Self-interest is a more convincing explana-
tion for whv so many individuals stand for 
band council elections. In both tribes council 
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seats and chieftainships are defined as full-time 
positions. A band councillor's salary, includ-
ing allowances and benefits, exceeds 520,000 
per year on both reserves. Aside from a few 
re;erve administrative positions, the coun-
cillors' and chief's positions are the highest 
paid positions on the reserve. Given the high 
rates of unemployment on both reserves, a 
council seat represents an extremely attractive 
employment opportunity. By comparison, 
remuneration for councilmen and mayors in 
adjacent non-Indian towns falls between 
$3,000 and 54,000 per annum respectively. For 
many candidates, then, band council elections 
are, in effect, the "politics of self-employment." 
Bevond immediate personal financial gain, 
moreover, a position on band council rep-
resents the opportunity to benefit family and 
friends through influence over the decisions on 
scarce resources, such as band jobs, services, 
and land. In short, leaders on both reserves 
have indicated to us that a council post is seen 
as a position from which an individual can 
directly benefit himself, relatives, and friends. 
The large number of candidates running 
for office is also related to the conception 
Indian people have of the band council as an 
institution. The primary function of band 
councils has been to serve as an administrative 
arm of the Department of Indian Affairs. As a 
consequence, band councils are not viewed by 
Indians as representative assemblies account-
able to band members. This eliminates the 
personal accountability factor that tends to 
discourage less than serious candidates in non-
Indian municipalities from running for office. 
Alberta municipalities have always exhibited a 
strong sense of local democracy and autono-
my. \Vhile municipalities in Alberta exist as 
legal creatures of the province, they neverthe-
less hold substantial discretionary powers 
under the Alberta Municipal Government 
Act. Under Section 112 of the Act, municipal-
ities are allowed to pass bylaws for "peace, 
order and good government," and "for pro-
moting the health, safety, morality and wel-
fare" of their citizens. Historically, the 
province has been reluctant to interfere with 
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the bylaw-making or discretionary powers of 
municipalities, preferring to let local democra-
c\' pre\'ail and correct its own mistakes when 
necessary. The extensive power of municipali-
ties in Alberta, coupled with a local property 
tax base that accounts for a large share of 
municipal revenue, has created a situation 
where citizens demand accountability from 
their elected councils. Councillors cannot shift 
blame to senior levels of government for bad or 
ineffective administration, By contrast, band 
councillors can always deflect the dissatisfac-
tion of electors by blaming the Department of 
Indian Affairs for lack of accomplishments, 
Thus, band councillors are spared some of the 
slings and arrows generallv associated with 
service on non-Indian municipal councils. 
Electoral Behavior. The distribution of votes 
among candidates, particularly on the Blood 
reserve, tends to give band council elections 
the flavor of a game of chance, In nearly all 
elections over the period under study the vote 
was so thinly distributed amongst candidates 
that even a very small shift in voter support 
would produce a greatly different election 
outcome. For example, in the 1984 Blood band 
council election, the bottom four elected 
candidates received 'votes of 165, 164, 160, and 
160, respectively, The next twenty-seven un-
successful candidates were not far behind, 
receiving between 159 and 100 votes, Our 
interviews suggest that elections are viewed by 
many candidates as a game in which anyone 
might win, This lottery atmosphere serves as 
an inducement for many people to stand as 
candidates. 
Recently, both bands introduced a candi-
date nomination fee, The nomination fee on 
the Blood reserve is $50.00, The Peigans began 
with a $75,00 nomination fee but raised it in 
the 1987 elections to $200,00 for council 
candidacy and $300.00 for the chieftainship, 
Tribal leaders hoped that a nomination fee 
would cause individuals to think more serious-
ly about running for council as well as reduce 
election costs by having fewer candidates, Our 
data indicates this tactic appears to be margi-
nally successful on the Peigan reserve where a 
reduction in the number of candidates has 
occurred since a nmnin,nion fee \\'a, intro-
duced, Caution i, needed, however, in gi\'ing 
undue credit w the nomination fcc for the 
reduction in the number of candidates in 
recent Feigan elecriom. \\'hile a significant 
decrease in cmdidates did occur between the 
1 Y79 and 1981 band council elections when 
the S75 fcc wa, introduced, onl\, an 1M percent 
drop in the number of candidates for council 
wok place in the 1987 elections when the 
nomination fee was raised to $2()().OLl. ~v1ore­
over, the number of candidates for chief 
increased from four to fi\'C in the 1987 election, 
despite the quadrupling of the nomination fee. 
On the Blood reserve, the number of candi-
dates actually increased by over ten percent 
after the imposition of a nomination fee, 
suggesting that tribal members may have 
reacted negatiwly to attempts bv band lead-
ership to limit their right to stand as council 
candidates. Another explanation is that a 
nomination fee of $50.00 is roo low to serve as 
Cl disincentive, Bv comparison. the Alberta 
Local Authorities Election Act sets a limit of 
$100.00 for nomination fees in municipalities 
with a population under 100,000. The nomi-
nation fcc in Cardston, Fort Macleod, and 
Fincher Creek, however, is on Iv $25.00. 
VoteT Participation. Voter participation 
rates are usually treated as indicators not onlv 
of citi:en interest in leadership selection, but 
arc also a reflection of interest in issues on the 
public agenda. During the period under study, 
\'Clter participation rates among members of 
the Blood and Peigan tribes ~1\'C[aged 51 
percent of eligible voters for the Bloods and 58 
percent for the Peigans. The Hawthorn study, 
conducted during the 1955-1965 period. 
,howed a similar voter turnout in the commu-
nities they studied. These voter turnout rates 
appear comparable to voter participation rmes 
during council elections in the neighboring 
non-Indian towns, which average 55 percent. -
(See Table I.) However, a comparison of voter 
turnouts between band and municipal council 
elections is problematic for two reasons. One. 
the voting age on both reserves is 21 years 
comp<1red to 18 years in municipal elections. 
And two, the high rates of poverty and social 
pathology on the reserves make interpretmion 
of Indian voter turnout difficult. A more 
meaningful comparison would be to relate 
present levels of participation by tribal mem-
hers in the leadership selection process under 
the Indian Act election system to participation 
under the traditional system of leadership 
selection. Under the traditional system leaders 
emerged from a consensual process with vir-
tuallv all adults participating. Under the 
elective system many tribal members do not 
participate in the leadership selection process 
and are pushed to the periphery of decision-
making. 
Re-Election of Incumbents. Re-election rates 
among Blood and Peigan councillors are much 
lower than those in the neighboring commu-
nities. In the non-Indian communities turn-
over of council membership usually results 
from decisions by incumbents not to run 
again. Except in Cardston, of those incum-
bents who stand for office again, over half are 
re-elected. On the two Indian reserves, howev-
er, our data indicate that most incumbent 
turnover is incurred by electoral defeat rather 
than by decisions on the part of council 
members not to run again for office. The high 
level of incumbent electoral defeat is, in part, 
attributable to the fact that a small shift in 
voter support is likely to result in an incum-
bent's being defeated. More significantly, 
however, the limited authority and lack of 
funds at a band council's disposal means it is 
simply not <1ble to satisfy the expectations of 
band members and this diss<1tisfaction is 
expressed in a lack of elector loyalty to 
incumbents. Interestingly, our interviews re-
\'eal that the low incumbent re-election rates 
do not reflect, except in isolated cases, a 
"thro\\' the rascals out" attitude. In general, 
elections on both reserves have not been 
characterized by deliberate efforts among 
groups of band members to prevent the re-
election of specific individuals. Unlike the 
to\\'l1 council elections in which councillors are 
held accountable for the state of the munici-
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palitv, in the band elections b<1nd members are 
aware of the very limited influence that their 
council members exert over the events and 
circumstances that affect their lives. 
The cumulative effect of so many incum-
bents being defeated results in unstable band 
councils. Nearly two-thirds of council mem-
bership changes every two years, leaving little 
scope for long range social and economic 
planning. A majority of councilmen have to be 
educated every two years about on-going 
policy initiatives and even about procedures of 
council. Both bands have lost opportunities 
for job-producing economic development be-
cause of inexperienced council members and 
instability. 
The incumbency of band chiefs, however, 
reflects a very different pattern of electoral 
behavior than that evident in band council 
elections. As a rule, chiefs on both reserves 
stay in office for much longer periods-ranging 
from six to fourteen years-and, over the 
period of our study, only one had been voted 
out of office. Chiefs, then, are more directly 
comparable to the mayors of the adjacent non-
Indian towns with respect to tenure in office. 
Our interviews with Indian leaders suggest 
that the more stable incumbency patterns of 
chiefs is due to the fact that the tribal 
chieftainship still retains much of its tradition-
al symbolic meaning for band members. That 
is, the chieftainship is perceived as a stabilizing 
and unifying institution for the tribe internally 
and as the formal representative of the tribe 
externally. In fact, however, a contemporary 
chief is nearly as powerless as the band council 
members. 
THE I~1PACT OF THE Ii\DIAN ACT ON 
TRADITIONAL RECRUITMENT PROCESSES 
Our findings regarding the way the Indian 
Act elective system operates on the Blood and 
Peigan reserves inform our second purpose: to 
discover how the Indian Act elective system, 
which is based upon Euro-Canadian values, 
has had an impact on traditional Indian 
leadership selection practices. 
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Ideologically, the Indian Act elective sys-
tem is based upon a contractarian concept of 
individual political rights, universal eligibility 
for political office, and the notion of formal 
representation. The leadership selection pro-
cess embodied in this system involves the 
selection of a set of decision-makers at definite 
intervals, the delegation of decision-making 
authority to these individuals (including the 
acceptance of the corollary obligation to be 
bound by that authority), and the right to 
change the decision-makers at the next elec-
tion. Underlying this process are the assump-
tions that the plurality system governs the 
operation of the electoral system in choosing 
representatives and that the decision-making 
process within the representative body will be 
by majority rule. A basic premise is that 
representatives are accountable to those who 
elect them. 
For the Blood and Peigan bands the 
traditional leadership selection process, as well 
as the delegation of authority, was grounded in 
the concepts of communalism, egalitarianism, 
and consensus. In practice, this meant that 
power, or authority, could not be claimed by 
any subset of the tribe. It was vested in the 
tribe as a whole and only delegated on a 
temporary basis. I, There was no fixed number 
of leaders; chiefs were chosen on the basis of 
their functional skills for leadership related to 
a particular task. In times of peril the band 
would turn to a warrior for leadership but as 
soon as the danger had passed his status 
reverted to that of just another band mem-
ber. i" In all cases, leadership selection involved 
extensive consultation among members and 
families of the Indian community. Traditional 
Indian leadership was essentially a meritocra-
cy, and good people were able to rise to 
influence through the family and clan, even-
tually becoming members of the tribal coun-
cil.:' Government without institutionalized 
ruling structures required special procedures. 
For the Blood and Peigan bands, those proce-
dures included direct participation in lead-
ership selection, and decision-making by 
consensus. 21 
How have the two distinctly different 
leadership selection systems interacted? In one 
sense, it can be argued that as an externally 
imposed institutional arrangement, the Indian 
Act band council elective system has contrib-
uted to the destruction of the traditional 
meritocratic leadership selection of the Blood 
and Peigan bands. A leadership selection 
system that is based upon individualized 
political rights and participation, that allows 
virtually unlimited entry into the leadership 
selection arena because of the absence of 
effecti ve candidate screening/sponsoring 
mechanisms, and allows for the election of 
council members by small pluralities is inimical 
to the traditional system that stressed collec-
tive agreement in the choosing of leaders and 
decision-making by consensus. 
In another sense, however, the malfunc-
tion of the Indian Act elective system can be 
seen as the consequence of two major hand-
icaps that have historically plagued Indian 
government in Canada: lack of effective inter-
nal governing authority and a concomitant 
lack of accountability to tribal members. 
Under the Indian Act, the authority of band 
governments has been reduced to by-law 
making bodies of the sort that "control bee 
keeping and the destruction of noxious 
weeds." Historically, the most significant pow-
ers of the Blood and Peigan band governments 
have been control of internal land allocation 
decisions. Moreover, the Indian Affairs policy 
of supporting band government through ear-
marked funds and the imposition of strict 
financial accounting procedures has in effect 
meant that program development and corre-
sponding funding priorities on the reserves 
have been determined by non-Indians rather 
than by band leadership. By incorporating 
band governments into the hierarchical struc-
ture of Indian Affairs, with its upward flow of 
administrative and financial accountability, 
the traditional Indian stress on the responsibil-
ity of leaders to the tribe has been under-
mined. 
A leadership selection process that results 
in political incumbents who are characterized 
bv lack of power and the absence of accounta-
bilitv to constituents serves as a fertile ground 
for economic egoism. In the case of the Blood 
and Peigan band council elections, economic 
egoism is reflected in the large number of 
candidates whose motivation in running for 
band council is self-interest and pecuniary 
gain. jv1oreO\'er, the long history of being 
accountable to Indian Affairs has produced a 
habitual incapacity among band councillors to 
\'iew their primary responsibilities as being to 
their constituents. On the other side of the 
coin, band members have lost the initiative to 
demand accountability from their elected 
representati ves. 
The Canadian government must accept 
primary responsibility for the deficiencies in 
the Indian Act elective system as it now 
operates on the Blood and Peigan reserves. By 
its refusal to incorporate the basic value of 
accountability into the leader-constituent 
relationships on the reserves, the Canadian 
govemment has precluded the development of 
responsive, responsible, and stable forms of 
Indian government. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Indian Act elective system does 
not function on reserves as do its counterparts 
in non-Indian communities. 
CcJ;\CLl;SIOl" 
There appears to be no turning back from 
the elective sYstem as the basis of band 
gO\·ernment. The acculturation of tribal mem-
bers to the elective system and the guarantee of 
democratic political rights under the Charter, 
\\hich legally precludes any form of leadership 
selection based on non-elective methods, en-
sures that some form of elective system for 
band council will remain in existence. Never-
theless, significant reforms can be made by 
Indi,m bands. The preceding analysis of band 
council elections suggests that if viable self-
go\'ernment is to develop on Indian reserves, 
Indian leaders must direct their attention to 
making the present band councils, or whatever 
type of legislative assembly that emerges, more 
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res~xmsive to the needs and demands of their 
constituents. 
First, the direction of accountability needs 
to be reversed. This process can begin by 
increasing the internal authority of band 
government, either constitutionally or legis-
latively. If the federal government is unwilling 
to do this then bands must do it through their 
own initiative. As band governments become 
a stronger political force within their commu-
nities, their dependency on the Department of 
Indian Affairs will lessen and the present 
situation, characterized by upward accounta-
bility, will decrease. Band councils may then 
become more like their counterparts in the 
adjacent non-Indian towns where a highly 
developed sense of political accountability 
exists on the part of council members toward 
their constituents. But, making band govern-
ments responsive and accountable to tribal 
members is also a matter of attitudinal change 
amongst both leaders and followers. Band 
government will not achieve greater internal 
authority un1css support is firmly rooted in the 
tribe itself. If the Bloods and Peigans are to use 
their governments as effective political instru-
ments for self-government, a major reorienta-
tion is required for both leaders and followers. 
This constitutes a task of great magnitude. As 
autonomous and responsive Indian govern-
ment becomes a reality, economic self-interest 
may diminish as a primary motive for political 
participation, and individuals whose first aim 
is to serve the needs of their people will run for 
council. 
Second, the retention of the band council 
elective system does not preclude efforts by 
Indian leaders to search for creative ways to 
bring the values associated with their tradi-
tional ways of choosing leaders into the 
modern political process. For example, the 
establishment of a ward system, which is 
permissible under the present Indian Act, 
could bring the electoral process closer to the 
people and increase the feeling of personal 
participation in the leadership selection pro-
cess. Another significant effect of having 
smaller electoral districts would be to place 
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councillors in a closer relationship to their 
constituents. Dialogue could be increased, and 
councillors would be in a better position to 
understand and react to constituents' needs. 
Moreover, a carefully designed ward system 
would be more compatible with traditional 
kinship selection and representative practices. 
Third, the leadership on both reserves 
should seriously consider eliminating (or re-
ducing to a token amount) the candidate 
nomination fee for band council elections as a 
device to limit the number of candidates. The 
nomination fee is a response to problems 
created by an imposed leadership selection 
system and has no basis in traditional Black-
foot political culture. Rather, it is inimical to 
the traditional meritocratic leadership selec-
tion method. Moreover, a nomination fee, 
particularly on the Peigan reserve, has the 
potential of not only being a formidable 
barrier to those of lower economic and social 
standing who wish to run for a council seat, 
but also of creating a self-perpetuating, class-
based, governing elite. 
Fourth, the problem of band council 
instability could be partly addressed by length-
ening the term of office from the present two 
years to four years. This change is possible 
under the custom provisions of the Indian Act 
under which both bands now operate. A four-
year term would allow councillors to gain 
experience and knowledge. Under the present 
two-year term they have only one year to gain 
experience before they become "lame ducks." 
During the last year of their term, their 
decisions are made in the context of the 
"anticipated reactions" of tribal members in 
the next election. The four-year term is more 
conducive to long-range economic and social 
planning. Four years could provide the time 
necessary to develop policies as well as provide 
an opportunity to monitor their implementa-
tion. 
Finally, in addition to initiating changes in 
the band council elective system, tribal leaders 
could establish institutions that more directly 
reflect their traditional philosophies and val-
ues. For example, constituting a Council of 
Elders to advise the band council could bring 
additional wisdom and experience into the 
decision-making process and, at the same time, 
preserve important cultural traditions among 
the Blackfoot. Such a complementary political 
structure could help restore a degree of consen-
sual decision-making by bringing more tribal 
members out of the periphery and into the 
decision-making process. Tribal institutions 
that reflect, even in part, traditional political 
ideals are more likely to engender the loyalty 
of their constituents, an essential ingredient 
for effective government. 
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